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Abstract. In the area of networks, a common method to enforce a secu-
rity policy expressed in a high-level language is based on an ad-hoc and
manual rewriting process [24]. We argue that it is possible to build a for-
mal link between concrete and abstract terms, which can be dynamically
computed from the environment data. In order to progressively introduce
configuration data and then simplify the proof obligations, we use the B
refinement process. We present a case study modeling a network mon-
itor. This program, described by refinement following the layers of the
TCP/IP suite protocol, has to warn for all observed events which do
not respect the security policy. To design this model, we use the event-B
method because it is suitable for modeling network concepts.
This work has been done within the framework of the POTESTAT1
project [9], based on the research of network testing methods from a
high-level security policy.
Key words: Security policy enforcement, refinement, TCP/IP layers.
1 Introduction
The separation between policies and mechanisms is considered as a main spec-
ification principle in security. The policy describes the authorized actions while
the mechanism is the method to implement the policy [24, 17]. Those two con-
cepts do not have the same abstraction level. The classical process to enforce a
policy consists of manually rewriting the policy in the same terms as the mech-
anism, with ad-hoc methods. We argue that a policy can be formally enforced
in a mechanism by gradually building, through a refinement process, a link be-
tween abstract and concrete terms. We propose to design a specification with
the same abstraction level as the policy and to refine it to obtain the concrete
mechanism. In the case of critical software, using an abstract specification is, for
example, required for test and audit processes or for certification according to
the Common Criteria [7].
To illustrate our approach, we describe a network security software which has
to enforce an abstract security policy in a TCP/IP network. Modern TCP/IP
⋆ Work supported by CNRS and ST-Microelectronics by the way of a doctoral grant.
1 Security policies: test directed analysis of open networks systems.
http://www-lsr.imag.fr/POTESTAT/
networks are heterogeneous and distributed, and their management becomes
more and more complex. Thus, the use of an abstract security policy can give
a global and comprehensive view of a network security [22]. We choose to focus
more specifically on an access control policy because it is the main concept in
network security [10, 20].
We aim at designing a monitor, which warns if an action, forbidden by the
policy, is observed on the network. In order to achieve that, we use the event-B
method [1] for modeling network concepts.
The next section is an overview of the event-B method. Section 3 intro-
duces networks and their security policy concepts. Then, Section 4 presents our
approach, Section 5 describes our method based on the refinement process. Sec-
tion 6 is a presentation of the case study. Finally, we conclude by comparing this
work to related ones and by giving some prospects.
2 Event-B
The B method [2] is a formal development method as well as a specification
language. B components can be refined and implemented. The correctness of
models and refinements can be validated by proof obligations.
Event-B [1] is an extension of the B language where models are described
by events instead of operations. The most abstract component is called system.
Each event is composed by a guard G and an action T such that if G is enabled,
then T can be executed. If several guards are enabled at the same time then the
triggered event is chosen in a nondeterministic way.
Through the refinement process, data representation can be changed. The
gluing invariant describes the relationship between abstract and concrete vari-
ables. If an event eA is refined by an event eR, then the refinement guard has
to imply the abstract one. Moreover, some events can be introduced during the
refinement process (refining the skip event), according to the same principles as
the stuttering in TLA [15]. Due to the guard strengthening through refinement
process, we have to prove that there is always at least one enabled event (no
dead-lock) and that new events do not introduce live-locks.
To conclude, Table 1 defines the set notations which are used thereafter and
Table 2 summarizes generalised substitutions.
Operator Meaning
A↔ B =ˆ {R | R ⊆ A×B}
dom(R) =ˆ {a | ∃b · ((a, b) ∈ R)}
ran(R) =ˆ {b | ∃a · ((a, b) ∈ R)}
R[A] =ˆ {b | ∃a · (a ∈ A ∧ (a, b) ∈ R)}
R−1 =ˆ {(b, a) | (a, b) ∈ R}
R1 ; R2 =ˆ {(a, c) | ∃b · ((a, b) ∈ R1 ∧ (b, c) ∈ R2)}
R1 || R2 =ˆ {((a, b), (c, d)) | (a, c) ∈ R1 ∧ (b, d) ∈ R2}
R ✄B =ˆ {(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ R ∧ b ∈ B}
A→p B =ˆ {F | F ∈ A↔ B ∧ ∀(b1, b2) · ((a, b1) ∈ F ∧ (a, b2) ∈ F ⇒ b1 = b2)}
Table 1. Used sets operators
Substitution Syntactical notation Mathematical notation
Do nothing skip skip
Assignment x := E x := E
Unbounded choice any z where P then T end @z · (P ⇒ T )
Condition if P then T1 else T2 end P =⇒ T1 [] ¬P =⇒ T2
Table 2. Used primitives substitutions
3 Introduction to Networks and their Security Policies
3.1 The TCP/IP Protocol Suite
Computer networks use a standard connection model, called OSI (Open Systems
Interconnection) [13], composed of seven layers. The TCP/IP protocol suite im-
plements this model but is described with only four layers: application, transport,
network and link. Each of these layers plays a particular role:
– The Application layer is the interface between the applications and the net-
work (client-side protocol).
– The Transport layer manages the host-to-host communications, but not the
route between them (peer-to-peer networks).
– The Network layer manages the route between networks by selecting the
network interface to use and the first router.
– The Link layer performs the signal translation (analogic/numeric) and syn-
chronizes the data transmission. This layer is most often provided by the
hardware. Therefore, it is not considered in the following sections.
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Fig. 1. Layers of the TCP/IP suite with some examples of protocols.
Communications using TCP/IP protocol are composed of protocols for each
layer in the suite. For example, a TCP datagram (Transport layer) is contained
in the data field of an IP packet (Network layer). Figure 1 shows an example of
communication using TCP/IP.
3.2 Network Security Policies
In the area of networks, security is mainly expressed in terms of access rights. An
access control policy is defined on a set of actions by a set of rules. These rules
determine, for each action, whether the action is authorized or not. Among the
various types of access control policies [11, 16], open policies and closed policies
can be distinguished. An open policy (Fig. 2.A) expresses all forbidden actions
(called negative authorizations): a not explicitly denied access is allowed. In a
closed policy (Fig. 2.B), all authorized actions have to be fully specified (called
positive authorizations). Finally, some policies are expressed with both positive
and negative rules (Fig. 2.C). In this case, some actions can be conflicting or
undefined.
Forbidden actions
Authorized actions
Authorized actions
Forbidden actions
Conflicting actions
Authorized actions
Forbidden actions
Undefined actions
A. Open policy B. Closed policy C. Both policies
Fig. 2. Example of open, closed and both policies.
In the following, readers should distinguish network events, which are the
elementary communication steps of the network, and B events, which are the
description of actions in the B method.
In the proposed approach, a closed policy defined by a single set (SP) of
authorized actions is used. However, each of these abstract actions can be asso-
ciated to one or more concrete network events and conversely.
Definition 1 (Types of Events). An event is correct with regard to a security
policy if it corresponds only to authorized actions of the policy (Fig. 3.A). If the
event is associated only to forbidden actions then this event violates the policy
(Fig. 3.B). If an event is linked to some authorized actions and to some forbidden
ones, then this event is in conflict with the policy (Fig. 3.C).
Actions
SP
Events Actions
SP
Events Actions
SP
Events
A. Correct with regard to SP B. Violates SP C. In conflict with SP
(Pass status) (Fail status) (Conflict status)
Fig. 3. Events correct with regard to SP , in violation of SP or in conflict with SP .
Several conformity relations [11, 19] can be used when conflicting events can
occur. The approach proposed in this article is the following:
Definition 2 (Network Conformity). A network conforms to a security pol-
icy if each event of this network is correct with respect to the policy.
Finally, if a security policy is relevant only to a part of the network, then all
events that are not associated to any action of the policy are unspecified.
4 Policy Security through TCP/IP Levels
4.1 Traceability from Policy to Implementation
The proposed approach aims to express a security policy at an abstract level
(on actions) and to preserve it through the refinement process until its imple-
mentation (on network events). However, each refinement level can only access
information from the protocol header of the corresponding TCP/IP layer (Fig. 1)
and has to implement the same security policy as the specification.
The model used to illustrate this approach is a monitor. A monitor has to
detect at least each network event which violates SP or which is in conflict with
SP . In the ideal case, no event correct w.r.t. SP is detected. The monitor has
then to guarantee, at each refinement level, the next two properties:
Property 1 (Monitor Correctness)
Each event that is not detected is correct with respect to the security policy.
Property 2 (Monitor Completeness)
Each event that is detected violates or is in conflict with the security policy.
In the model, the network events representation gradually changes at each
refinement (from actions to concrete events). To implement these properties, the
link between the different representations has then to be modeled, in a systematic
way, at each refinement level. So, the end user (the administrator of a network)
can choose the abstraction level of his policy (by using or not the more abstract
levels of the model) and each event is traced through the refinement, as needed
for some certification process such as the one of the Common Criteria [7].
Each refinement level represents how the communication is seen between two
elements of the network. At level 0, events correspond to the access by a user to
a service. They are considered as actions of the security policy. At level 1, events
are messages between daemons (Application layer). At level 2, events are requests
between hosts and are attached to particular ports (Transport layer). At level 3,
each event is a connection between interfaces and is attached to particular ports
(Network layer). Table 3 summarizes these different representations.
Level of specification Network concepts TCP/IP layer
0 (Policy level, actions) Users, services
1 Daemons, Terminal servers Application
2 Hosts, ports Transport
3 (implementation) Interfaces, ports Network
Daemon: software server providing some services.
Terminal server: particular daemon providing some logging services.
Host: machine of the network.
Ports: channels associated, on each host, to zero or one daemon.
Interface: network interface (e.g. a network card).
Table 3. Networks concepts by refinement level
These network concepts can be extracted from information contained in con-
figuration files. For example the list of registered Linux users can be found in the
/etc/passwd file and the list of daemons hosted on each machine can be found
in /etc/init.d/. This information can then be used to associate each network
event to an action of the policy.
Finally, an observer is introduced in the model to give the internal status
(Pass , Fail or Conflict - Fig. 3) associated to each observed network event. As
the event representation changes through the refinement process, the parameters
of the observer are described in global variables.
4.2 Example
To illustrate the notions of conflict and failure, here is a short example (Fig. 4)
of a monitor that receives a copy of each message from the network and that is
parametrized by a security policy and the network configuration.
Network installation
SP= {(James, Intranet),
(James,Mail),
(Alice,Mail)}
Security policy
Host1 is used by James or Alice
Intranet is hosted on the port 80 from Host2
Mail is hosted on the port 993 from Host2.
Network configuration information
Fig. 4. Example of the monitor installation
A message coming from Host1 and going to Host2 at port 80, is necessar-
ily sent by James or Alice, because they are the only referenced Host1 users.
Moreover, due to the accessed port of Host2, and according to the configuration
information, the service can only be the Intranet. However, the security policy
SP only allows James to access to the Intranet. Thus, the observed message is
in Conflict .
Now, if the message comes from Host1 and goes to port 993 of Host2, then
the accessed service is Mail and all the users of Host1 are authorized to access
it. Therefore, this message is correct w.r.t. the security policy (Pass case).
Finally, if a message is exchanged with a host (Host3) which is not in the
described part of the network, then no user or action is associated to it by the
network configuration: the event is ignored.
5 Description of Refinement Levels
As previously said, each refinement level represents a different layer of the
TCP/IP protocol suite (Table 3). In the first subsection, we define the data do-
main attached to each refinement level. Next, we present a systematic approach
to model the links between refinements, based on configuration files. Then, we
introduce journals in order to establish the monitor correctness and complete-
ness properties (Properties 1 and 2). Finally, we describe the observer allowing
to trace the status of each event through the refinement process.
5.1 Events Representation
Table 4 gives the representation of the events for each refinement level, according
to the network concepts presented in Table 3. Moreover, the incoming ports are
modeled while the outgoing ports are not so (Levels 2 and 3, Table 4). Outgoing
ports are useless as long as the history of connections is not taken into account.
Indeed, outgoing ports are dynamically and randomly chosen and cannot be
used to identify a daemon or a user, contrary to the incoming ports, that are
statically reserved for each service (managed by the IANA2).
Level of specification Network events representation
0 (Policy level) Net0 = USERS × SERVICES
1 Net1 = DAEMONS ×DAEMONS
2 Net2 = HOSTS × (HOSTS × PORTS)
3 (Implementation) Net3 = INTERFACES × (INTERFACES × PORTS)
Table 4. Network events representation for each refinement level
The policy is enforced only on the known part of the network. The constant
KnownNet i represents the known network subset at each level i. Each set is
divided into a known and an unknown part, as follows:
Known Network Definition:
Users⊂USERS ∧ Services⊂SERVICES ∧ Daemons⊂DAEMONS ∧ Hosts⊂HOSTS
∧ TerminalServers ⊆ Daemons ∧ Ports ⊂ PORTS ∧ Interfaces ⊂ INTERFACES
∧ KnownNet0 = Users × Services
∧ KnownNet1 = TerminalServers ×Daemons
∧ KnownNet2 = Hosts × (Hosts × Ports)
∧ KnownNet3 = Interfaces × (Interfaces × Ports)
These abstract sets correspond to concrete data extracted from configura-
tion files. Finally, the security policy is described by the constant set SP of all
authorized actions of the known network.
Security Policy Definition:
SP ⊆ KnownNet0
5.2 Representation Relation
The event representation changes through the refinement process. The relation
Representsi defines the representation link between the i
th and (i − 1)th refine-
ment levels. For example, Represents
1
associates each terminal server to a set of
users and each daemon to a set of services. Note that Representsi is a relation
and not a function because a concrete event is not always associated to a single
abstract event (as seen in the example from Section 4.2). It is neither a function
from KnownNet i−1 to KnownNet i because an action can be associated to sev-
eral concrete events. These relations can be composed to define Representsi 0
between the ith level and the policy level.
2 IANA = Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
Representation Relation axioms:
Represents
i
∈ KnownNet i ↔ KnownNet i−1 (with i∈1..3)
∧ Represents
i 0
∈KnownNet i ↔ KnownNet0 (with i∈1..3)
∧ Represents
i 0
= (Represents
i
;Represents
i−1
; . . . ;Represents
1
) (with i∈1..3)
In order to simplify some further invariants, we define Represents
0
as the
identity (id(Net0)). Finally, each element mentioned in the configuration has to
be associated with at least one action and one network event:
The Described Sub-Network is Known as a Whole:
dom(Represents
i
) = KnownNet i ∧ ran(Represents i) = KnownNet i−1
5.3 Journalizing Observed Events
Three journals are maintained: the one of observed events (Monitored i) and two
other ones of warned events (FAILi and CONFLICT i respectively for the events
which violate and are in conflict with the policy). All these journals are defined
as non-ordered sets, because the considered policy does not take into account
the history. Moreover, all warned events are observed and all events observed in
a concrete level are also observed in the abstract level. At the policy level, no
conflict can occur, then CONFLICT 0 is empty.
Invariant (General Journals Definition)
Monitored0 ⊆ KnownNet0
∧ Monitored i ⊆ Represents
−1
i
[Monitored i−1] (with i ∈ 1..3)
∧ CONFLICT 0 = ∅
∧ FAILi ∪ CONFLICT i ⊆ Monitored i (with i ∈ 0..3)
∧ FAILi ∩ CONFLICT i = ∅ (with i ∈ 0..3)
Properties 1 and 2 can be expressed on these journals, by the next two invariants:
(1) All observed events associated with Pass status are correct w.r.t. SP :
Invariant (Monitor Correctness - Property 1)
Represents
i 0
[Monitored i − FAILi − CONFLICT i] ⊆ SP (with i ∈ 0..3)
(2) No event associated with Conflict or Fail status is correct w.r.t. SP :
Invariant (Monitor Completeness - Property 2)
Represents
i 0
[FAILi] ∩ SP = ∅ (with i ∈ 0..3)
∧ ∀ei · (ei ∈ CONFLICT i ⇒ Represents i 0[{ei}] 6⊆ SP) (with i ∈ 0..3)
5.4 Observer Introduction
The B event Get status is an observer of the network events. It returns the status
of an event chosen in a nondeterministic way. Because of the change of event
representation, the observer is modeled with two new global variables: ObsEvent
and ObsStatus . ObsEvent is the chosen observed event (ObsEvent i ∈ KnownNet i)
and ObsStatus is its status (ObsStatus i ∈ {Pass ,Fail ,Conflict}). Fig. 5 gives the
general implementation of the observer Get status.
The variables ObsEvent and ObsStatus are defined at each refinement level
with the following invariant:
Get status =ˆ any ei where ei ∈ Monitored i then
if ei ∈ FAILi then ObsEvent i := ei || ObsStatus i := Fail
elsif ei ∈ CONFLICT i then ObsEvent i := ei || ObsStatus i := Conflict
else ObsEvent i := ei || ObsStatus i := Pass
end
end
Fig. 5. General definition of the Get status event
Invariant (Observed Variables)
Monitored i 6= ∅ ⇒
((ObsStatus i = Fail)⇔ (ObsEvent i ∈ FAILi))
∧ ((ObsStatus i = Conflict)⇔ (ObsEvent i ∈ CONFLICT i))
∧ ((ObsStatus i = Pass)⇔ (ObsEvent i ∈ Monitored i − FAILi − CONFLICT i))
The observed event is traced through the refinement process:
Invariant (Relation through Refinement)
(ObsEvent i,ObsEvent i−1) ∈ Represents i
Finally, correctness and completeness of the monitor (Properties 1 and 2) are
implemented on the journals with the invariants defined in Section 5.3. However,
these properties can also be checked on the observed variables. So, if the following
assertions hold, then Properties 1 and 2 are verified:
Assertion 1 (Monitor Correctness on Observed Variables)
Monitored i 6= ∅ ∧ ObsStatus i = Pass ⇒ ObsStatus i−1 = Pass (with i ∈ 0..3)
Assertion 2 (Monitor Completeness on Observed Variables)
Monitored i 6= ∅ ⇒ (with i ∈ 0..3)
(ObsStatus i = Fail ⇒ ObsStatus i−1 = Fail)
∧ (ObsStatus i=Conflict⇒Represents i 0[{ObsEvent i}] 6⊆SP)
∧ (ObsStatus i=Conflict⇒Represents i 0[{ObsEvent i}]∩SP 6=∅)
Therefore we only discuss the verification of those assertions that are suffi-
cient to show Properties 1 and 2.
6 Model Description
In the previous section, we have presented, in a systematic way, all data required
for the model development. In this section, we describe successively each level
by introducing: the configuration data, the B events and the construction of
the Representsi relation. All invariants and properties described in the previous
section are included at each description level.
In this description, we also focus on the verification of the correctness and
the completeness properties of the monitor by checking Assertions 1 and 2.
6.1 Level 0: User-Service View
The SP constant set is given by the user while constants Users and Services are
retrieved from configuration files. Journals are represented as abstract variables
and are empty in the initial state (Monitored0 := ∅ and FAIL0 := ∅). Con-
sequently, the observed variables are initially undefined (ObsEvent0 :∈ Net0 ∧
ObsStatus0 :∈ {Pass ,Fail ,Conflict}). If an event e0 occurs on the network then:
– if e0 is not in the observed sub-network then Event filter (Figure 6.B) is
launched and e0 is ignored,
– else Check event (Figure 6.A) is launched and e0 is stored in Monitored0.
Moreover, if e0 violates the policy then it is journalized in FAIL0.
Check event =ˆ any e0 where e0 ∈ KnownNet0 then
Monitored0 := Monitored0 ∪ {e0} ||
if e0 6∈ SP then FAIL0 := FAIL0 ∪ {e0} end
end
Event filter =ˆ any e0
where e0 ∈ Net0
∧ e0 6∈ KnownNet0
then skip end
A. Check event B. Event filter
Fig. 6. Code of B events Check event and Event filter at the policy level.
Finally, this level establishes Properties 1 and 2 by verifying Assertions 1 and 2
with the observed variables only, since there is no conflict at this level.
6.2 Level 1: Servers View
According to Table 3, the daemons sets (Daemons and TerminalServers) are
now described. The relation between this level and the more abstract one, i.e. the
policy level, is extracted from configuration files. Each daemon is configured with
its registered users and its provided services. We model this information with
two relations (Provide and Used By) describing which user can be connected to
a particular terminal server and which daemon provides a particular service. For
example, the registered users list of a telnet server can be found in /etc/passwd.
Represents
1
Definition:
Used By ∈ TerminalServers ↔ Users ∧ Provide ∈ Daemons ↔ Services
∧ Represents
1
= (Used By || Provide)
Check event =ˆ any e1 where e1 ∈ KnownNet1 then
Monitored1 := Monitored1 ∪ {e1} ||
let E0 be E0 = (Used By || Provide)[e1] in
if E0 ∩ SP 6= ∅ then
FAIL1 := FAIL1 ∪ {e1}
elsif E0 6⊆ SP then
CONFLICT 1 := CONFLICT 1 ∪ {e1}
end
end
end
Event filter =ˆ any e1
where e1 ∈ Net1
∧ e1 6∈ KnownNet1
then skip end
A. Check event B. Event filter
Fig. 7. Code of the B events Check event and Event filter at level 1.
The journals and the observed variables are defined according to the invari-
ants given in Section 5. At this level of refinement, the relation Represents
1
is
used dynamically by the B event Check event (Figure 7.A) to compute the sta-
tus of the observed network event, while the B event Event filter (Figure 7.B)
ignores all messages exchanged with the unknown part of the network.
The observer refinement (Fig. 5) produces 18 proof obligations, which, asso-
ciated to the three ones generated for Assertions 1 and 2, establish Properties 1
and 2 on the model.
6.3 Level 2: Hosts View
As described in Table 3, this level introduces the notions of Hosts and Ports . The
relation between these concepts and the daemons is extracted from hosts con-
figuration information. They are summarized by two functions: Hosting, which
associates the hosts to the daemons, and Run on, which precises the ports used
by a particular daemon on a host. Configuration data is such that:
Represents2 Definition:
Hosting ∈ Hosts ↔ Daemons ∧ Run on ∈ Hosts × Ports →p Daemons
∧ Represents
2
= (Hosting ✄ TerminalServers) || Run on
Just as in previous levels, the journals and the observed variables are defined
according to the invariants given in Section 5. The relation Represents2 is used
by Check event (Figure 8.A) to compute the status of the observed network
event, while Event filter (Figure 8.B) ignores all messages exchanged with the
unknown part of the network.
The main contribution of this level is the implementation of the Check event
event (Figure 8.A), which progressively refines the method to compute the E0
set of all actions associated to the observed network events e2.
Check event =ˆ any e2 where e2 ∈ KnownNet2 then
Monitored2 := Monitored2 ∪ {e2} ||
let E1 be E1 = ((Hosting ✄ TerminalServers) || Run on)[{e2}] in
let E0 be E0 = (Used By || Provide)[E1] in
if E0 ∩ SP 6= ∅ then
FAIL2 := FAIL2 ∪ {e2}
elsif E0 6⊆ SP then
CONFLICT 2 := CONFLICT 2 ∪ {e2}
end
end
end
end
A. Check event
Event filter =ˆ any e2 where e1 ∈ Net2 −KnownNet2 then skip end
B. Event filter
Fig. 8. Code of the B events Check event and Event filter at level 2.
In the same way as in the previous level, Properties 1 and 2 are established
by proving the three proof obligations generated for Assertions 1 and 2 and the
32 proof obligations generated for the observer event Get status.
6.4 Level 3: Implementation
At this level, hosts are valuated into their IP address (32 bit natural which
identifies hosts for the Network layer) and ports remain unchanged. For example,
the host anchieta.imag.fr can be valuated into its IP address 129.88.39.37 by
using its 32 bit natural value3: 2170038053.
The Represents
3
relation is thus the identity and all invariants are inherited
and do not need to be proven again. All other constants (security policy and
configuration information) have also to be valuated. Network parameters can be
retrieved in configuration files while the security policy has to be given by the
administrator. Table 5 gives some concrete examples for Fedora-Core (a Linux
distribution) of files containing usable data.
Refinement level Constant Data file
0 (Policy level) Users and Services /etc/passwd and /etc/init.d/
1 Provide and Used By Configuration files of each server
2 Run on and Hosting /etc/services and /etc/init.d/
3 (Implementation) Interfaces /etc/hosts
Table 5. Example of configuration files for Fedora-Core system.
However, the event-B language cannot be directly implemented. The model
is translated into classical B. This transformation is done by some ad-hoc meth-
ods based on the results of the MATISSE4 project [6, 3]. Since the guards of
Event filter and Check event are disjoint, the events are replaced by the single
operation Check event and Event filter (Fig. 9). Moreover, the network event
e3 chosen in the guard any e3 where e3 ∈ Net3 is replaced by three input
parameters IP1, IP2 and Po representing respectively the IP address of the two
hosts and the incoming port.
Check event and Event filter(IP1, IP2, P o) =ˆ begin
/* Typing precondition: (IP1, (IP2, P o)) ∈ Net3 */
var tmp in
tmp←− Is In KnownNet(IP1, IP2, P o) ;
if tmp =true then /* Case of Check event */
Src := IP1 ; Dest := IP2 ; Port := Po ;
tmp←− Is e3 Out Of SP(IP1, IP2, P o) ;
if tmp =true then Status := Fail ;WriteFail(IP1, IP2, P o)
else
tmp←− Is e3 In SP(IP1, IP2, P o) ;
if tmp =false then Status := Conflict ;WriteConflict(IP1, IP2, P o)
else Status := Pass end
end
end /* Else case of Event filter : skip */
end
end
Fig. 9. Implementation of the B event Check event .
3 2170038053 = ((129 ∗ 256 + 88) ∗ 256 + 39) ∗ 256 + 37
4 Methodologies and Technologies for Industrial Strength Systems Engineering (MA-
TISSE): IST Programme RTD Research Project (2000-2003).
Figure 9 is the implementation of Check event and Event filter operation. It
uses three local operations (Is In KnownNet , Is e3 Out Of SP and Is e3 In SP)
to compute the correctness of each observed event. These operations are imple-
mented as refinements of the corresponding parts of Check event at level 2. For
example, the local operation Is e3 Out Of SP is defined in Figure 10.
rr ←− Is e3 Out Of SP(IP1, IP2, P o) =ˆ
pre (IP1, (IP2, P o)) ∈ KnownNet3 then
rr=bool((Used By || Provide)[ /*Represents
1
[*/
((Hosting✄TerminalServers) || Run on)[ /* Represents
2
[*/
{(IP1, (IP2, P o))} /* {(IP1, (IP2, P o))}*/
] /* ]*/
] ∩ SP = ∅) /* ] ∩ SP = ∅*/
end
Fig. 10. Abstract definition of the Is e3 Out Of SP local operation.
The Monitored i set, modeled to store the monitored events, is not imple-
mented, while FAIL and CONFLICT sets are stored in files. That is managed
by an external component providing the operations WriteFail and WriteConflict .
However, Properties 1 and 2 still hold, since the observed variable ObsStatus2
and ObsEvent 2 remain unchanged.
Finally, constants (configuration data and security policy) are exported in
an external component as shown in Fig. 11. Thus, the model is generic and can
be completely proved independently of the configuration data. The user just
needs to provide some network information, or to retrieve it from configuration
files, and to fulfill the conditions on configuration stated in Sections 5.3 and 5.2.
A similar approach has been used in Me´te´or [5], the Parisian subway without
driver, to develop some generic and reusable components.
If the model is valuated for a simple example of network with two hosts,
two daemons, one service and one user, then 31 proof obligations are generated
and only 26 of them are discharged by the automatic prover. The five remaining
proof obligations have been interactively discharged, but are really obvious and
only need two commands : replace (eh) and predicate prover (pp(rp.0)).
Implementation
Constants
Level2
Level1
Policy level
Implementation
File
management
Implementation
Fig. 11. General model organisation
7 Conclusion
This work has been done within the framework of the POTESTAT5 project
[9], which aims at proposing a methodology for network security testing from
5 Security policies: test directed analysis of open networks systems.
high-level security policies. The main problem is to establish the conformity
relation in order to automatically generate test cases and oracles from an abstract
specification, as it has been implemented in the TGV tool [12] from IRISA and
Verimag french laboratories.
Our contribution is a method to automatically enforce an abstract secu-
rity policy on a network. In order to achieve that, we build a formal relation
(Representsi 0) between abstract and concrete levels. The dynamic part of the
program (Check event and Event filter) computes all actions associated to each
observed event. Finally, we guarantee, by using an observer (Get status), that
all violations and conflicts are detected at each refinement level (Property 1)
and that no warning is issued for an event which is correct with respect to the
policy (Property 2).
The work of D. Senn, D. Basin and of G. Caronni [21] and of G. Vigna [23]
are also dealing with the modeling of network conformity of a security policy.
The model of [23] supports all the TCP/IP layers but does not provide a formal
definition of the policy and needs human interaction to produce the test cases,
while the model introduced in [21] only considers the first two layers and uses a
low-level policy.
In this paper, we described the development of a network monitor, and the
same approach can be used for generation, verification or test of a network
configuration. The relationship is built in the same way and only the dynamic
part of the model has to be modified.
In particular, many works have been developed relative to the generation of
firewall configurations. For example, Firmato [4] is a tool generating the firewall
configuration from a security policy and a network topology, and the POWER
tool [18], of Hewlett-Packard, can rewrite a security policy into devices configu-
ration. However, Firmato needs some topology information and uses a low-level
policy, and POWER requires some human interactions during the process. The
work presented here does not need human interaction (if all proof obligations
are automatically discharged) or topology information. Due to the existence of
the conflict status, it seems more adapted to the monitoring approach.
Finally, in our model, the conflict case can be removed if Representsi 0 is a
function from KnownNet i to KnownNet0, as done in [8] with a security policy
expressed in the OrBAC framework [14]. In order to achieve that, we have to
recognize the user and the service associated to each event. It can be realistic to
associate only one service to each port, but it is too strict to impose that each
host can be used by only one user. An investigation should be done to properly
compare their approach with ours.
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